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The problem with Belgian football competition is that in the long run, and as reality
shows us in the short term, the contemporary situation will lead to market failures and the
elimination of some of the clubs. The solution proposed in this paper is the creation of a new
professional competition with fewer teams combined with territorial exclusivity in a centre with
a potential number of consumers that reach a certain absolute or relative threshold.
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1. The changing environment of professional football 
 
In Europe, prior to the 1990s, the objective of the (professional) football club was to provide entertainment by 
achieving playing success while remaining solvent and not to maximise profit. Sloane(1971) indicated that 
profit-making clubs in Europe has been the exception and not the rule. Chairmen, directors and patronages with 
a controlling function in the football clubs first reached success in other business fields. Their motives to invest 
in sport were more a desire for prestige, power or sporting enthusiasm and can be seen as a form of philanthropy. 
They get the best seats and a chance to mix with people in similar positions as themselves.  Profit seems unlikely 
to be a motivation factor. The pursuit of playing success is the main objective and the clubs can be defined as a 
win (utility) maximisation oriented subject to some financial constraints. The changing structure of European 
professional football made that most of the European top clubs no longer have the structure of the SSSL model. 
The rising impact of television and media companies and the emerging interest of multinationals corporations on 
professional football gave rise to a professional management approach, but did not bring financial stability. 
Another change was the use of the ability of the new investors to mobilize additional funding for further growth. 
According to Andreff & Staudohar(2002:31-33) the new owners implemented forms of vertical integration in the 
industry and created synergisms as a result of the interaction between business and sport. The result is an 
evolution from the SSSL model to the more global oriented Media-Corporations-Merchandising-Markets or 
MCCM-model. 
 
2. The economic geographical dimension of professional football 
 
Professional football has been transformed to a person-related immaterial consumer-oriented service with a 
short-term utility and an economic function. (Dejonghe, 2001: 289-293). The consequence is that a "professional 
football club" can be described as a central place function with a high threshold, a minimum absolute or real 
number of potential consumers. This definition implies that only densely populated locations combined with a 
rate of centrality can sustain a professional club. This transition implies that clubs in countries and cities with a 
small population have a competitive disadvantage. Market orientation, as a main causation in the extent of an 
economic product, leads to a situation of cumulative cycles. High attendance leads to more income from 
sponsors and media, that can be invested in players which in turn leads to better results and higher attendance,… 
The long-term success of professional football can be seen as an endogenous demand-oriented growth model 
based on Myrdalls’ cumulative causation process. 
 






These tendencies imply that clubs should be run as a business with a future policy perspective in a free market 
environment. They have to transform their "service" to maximise the attractiveness, their total economic value. 
The economic objective is that total gate receipts, income from advertising, commercial inflow, television and 
other media earnings have to be maximised for the economic product “the league. In Belgium where there were 
no major changes in the governance structure of football in the 1990's, the SSSL-model still dominates the 
league. 
 
The market of a professional football club and its league has to be located and defined in the tertiary sector. The 
clubs can be seen as heterogeneous, which refers to the potential product differentiation between the clubs with 
their individual club-specific characteristics and the necessity of a long-term budget to sustain the club results in 
the creation of a monopolistic competitive market structure, which is co-ordinated by one internationally 
recognised national football association. The number of clubs playing in the first league is determined by the 
central bureaucratic association and is not connected to the demand in the national market. The endogenous limit 
of the number of football clubs in the first division and the necessity of co-operation result in the creation of a 
producer’s cartel. The purpose of such a cartel is the striving for profit-maximisation by limiting mutual 
competition combined with supply optimisation. The substitution of the term firm by professional football club 
and total costs by budget is a rather good description of a top-competition. Dejonghe(2001:p.296) described the 
market of the product “professional football league” as a coalition in a near-cartel competition of heterogeneous 
interdependent oligopolic football clubs, which is organised by the international recognised football association.  
 
3. The consequences for Belgian footballcompetition 
 
The question that can be asked is “Is there a need for a professional football league in Belgium?” If the answer to 
this question is affirmative then an economic analysis is necessary. Because of the abscence of transparency in 
the bookkeeping system the sources of revenue for the Belgium competition are not known. The situation today 
in Belgium is: 
 
-  A average attendances of 9,500 spectators in the last few years
1 
-  50% of the attendances attend 4 clubs 
-  Broadcasting rights of €15 million for season 2003-2004 
-  Lack of international impact and the associated income loss from demand oriented broadcasting rights 
-  Total budget of the first division (18 teams) is only €133 million
23 
-  No barriers between professional and amateur football 
-  Teams on the edge of bankruptcy and heavy debts 
 
The ownership structure of football clubs did change in the nineties. The Belgian league became a secondary 
competition and a “stepping stone” for players from outside the EU. The minimum wages in Belgium for non-
EU players in 1995 was about €25,000. De Decker and Wille, two senators of the Flemish Liberal Party VLD
4 
were the founding fathers of the proposal that raised the minimum wage to €60,424. The existence of the severe 
restrictions for non-EU players in the UK and the Netherlands
5 made Belgian clubs interesting for cooperation. 
The increasing impact of the economic principles on football results, as seen above, in a classification of the 
                                                 
1For the season 2002-2003: Germany (33,794), Italy(25,474), England(35,464), Spain(28,593), France(19,757) and the 
Netherlands(16,255). Belgium has an attendance of 9 people per every 1000 inhabitants a higher relative rate than Germany(4.5), 
England(6.5), France(3.5) and Italy (4.8)  
2 2000-2001 season : England € 1.5 billion, Italy € 850 million, Spain and Germany  € 700 million (Dejonghe, 2001: 414) 
3 This means that the broadcasting rights are 11.2%(€15 million) of the total budget 
4 The reason for their intervention was the abuse of mostly young African players by their “agents”. The commission Internal Affairs 
decided that a raise of the minimum salary for non-EU players coud be used as a wapen against these practices. (Senaat, Persmededeling, 
16 juli 2002) 
5 In the Netherlands was the mimimum salary for a 18-19 year old non-EU player 75% of the average salary or €218,246.25 and for 20 
years and older 150% or €436,492.50. The Department of Education and Employment(DEE) controls the “quality” of the non-EU players. 
They demand some proof of the skills of the players(playing in 75% of the official competitive games of the national squad, country has 




clubs in (inter)national and local ones, where for a survival on the long term the economic spatial potentials 
have to be analysed. The central topic or the necessary minimal conditions are in this case the presence of 
potential fans and the willingness of the local firms, industry and government to invest in the club and its 
infrastructure. This concept results in a perception where professional football and the urban hierarchical and 
spatial structure are interdependent. Belgium is too small a market to support eighteen pro teams. 13 of these 18 
teams play in the Flemish market. The other five teams draw their fans from the 4 million French-speaking 
Belgians.Whenever the future of Belgian football is discussed, two solutions are always brought up: 
  
1. decrease the number of clubs to 16, 14 or even 12 
2. make an BENE-league, being an international league with the Netherlands.
6 
 
The problem being the TV revenues, one can easily calculate how the team revenues would benefit from a 
bigger TV contract. Decreasing the number of clubs could eventually double the TV revenues for the big market 
teams, and especially (SC Anderlecht) Brussels(1.6 million euros instead of 0.8 million) would benefit , but 
would hardly influence the total revenue the way the Champions League does. For the Belgian clubs 
participating in the CL is crucial and can represent up to 40 % of the yearly revenues. In this contribution we will 
focus us upon an exogenous decrease to 14 clubs.  
 
4. The competition in space 
 
“ A good location provides the firm with strategic advantages that competition may find difficult to overcome. 
While other marketingmix elements may be easily changed in response to a changing environment, locations 
represent long-term investment that can be changed only at a considerable cost.”(Ghosh & Craig, 1983: p.56) 
 
4.1. The location-allocation model 
 
The Hotelling and Lösch maxim are examples of economic geographical location forms of two competitive 
suppliers in a uniform market area. Lösch’ classical locational equilibrium model assumed a market with rational 
consumers and homogeneous suppliers, operating in the simplest possible uniform spatial context
7.. Hotelling 
(1929), on the other hand analysed the location patterns of a linear duopolistic market for a homogeneous 
product with no price-competition in an area with a spatially uniform distributed population. The result was that 
the location of the two suppliers would be next to each other in the centre of the spatial market otherwise the 
market would evolve to a Löschian equilibrium. The long-term survival of more than one supplier is only 
possible if the total demand is sufficient to support both suppliers. 
 
The location-allocation models, where the location of several competitive facilities in a geographical market is 
analysed, are extensions of classical equilibrium models, and can be used to locate the first division football 
clubs in an area. The models determine the location and the spatial interdependence of several competitive 
facilities in a bounded geographical market. In other words, they detect simultaneous localisation of several 
suppliers combined with the allocation of the potential consumers. Location-allocation refers to two vital basic 
assumptions necessary in location decisions: 
 
-  the optimal location of the supplier or service 
-  the allocation to the respective suppliers or services of the potential consumers with their specific 
consumer behaviour and mobility constraints 
                                                 
6 Anderlecht in Belgium en PSV in the Netherlands supported this until PSV dropped the idea pressured by Ajax and Feyenoord.  
7 Lösch(1936) argued that firms had to establish themselves not in the location with the minimum cost or maximum turnover but in the 
place where profit maximisation occurs. The demand for a product is a distance-decay function. The distance where the demand is equal 
to 0, the Christaller’s range, is after rotation of the distance-decay function around the Q-axis, a circle that will be transformed into a 
hexagon, by the presence of spatial competition. The volume or demand cone of that market is the sum of the potential consumers in that 





A number of important questions, which need to be solved in location models, are: (Daskin, 1995, p.3) 
 
-  How many facilities should be planned?  
-  Where should each facility be located? 
-  How large should each facility be? 
-  How should the demand for the facilities’ services be allocated to the facilities?  
 
The number and size of facilities to be located is often a function of the service-cost trade-offs. In the public 
sector, with a non-monetary and social utility maximisation principle, the aim is to maximize coverage of the 
area. In these models the demand is, just like in the models of Lösch and Hotelling, often assigned to the nearest 
facility. The main objectives of location-allocation models are the simultaneous and optimal location, 
considering: (Dejonghe, 2001: p.424) 
 
-  The company objectives (profit maximisation, utility maximisation,…) 
-  Consumer characteristics (market potential, income, profile,…) 
-  Distance and regional accessibility (public transport, highways, traffic congestion, parking facilities,…) 
-  Competitive environment (competitors, spatial interaction,…) 
 
The importance of location strategy is very significant. According to Daskin (1995), the success or failure of 
both private and public sector facilities depends in part on the locations chosen for the facilities.The combination 
of spatial location and optimising the demand is known as the covering problem in the location-allocation 
models. (Church et all.,1974;1979; Thomas,1993; Daskin,1995; Daskin et all.,1999; Golledge et all.,1997) The 
objective of these models is to identify the locations that provide potential consumers with coverage within a 
specified distance or time constraint. One of the important characteristics of the covering models of 
homogeneous services is the existence of a lack of competition. The purpose of the model is to find those 
locations that will be successful in the long run. The long-term equilibrium is an interdependence matrix of 
potential locations searching for a combination that covers the market in an optimal mode. The covering models 
have to maximise the utility (public sector) or the profit (private sector) of the potentials of the market and to 
optimise the location of the facilities in the economic and geographical space. 
 
One of the main problems of the set of covering models is that the number of facilities that are necessary to 
cover the total number of potential consumers exceed the number that can, for budgetary reasons, be built. This 
problem resulted in the creation of some relaxation in the models. This relaxation of the purposes can be divided 
in: 
 
-  relaxation of the total coverage, a maximum covering problem used in the private sector  
-  relaxation of the coverage distance, a mini-max or centre problem used in the public sector 
 
4.2 Professional football: a modified maximum covering model 
 
Professional football is typified as a market-oriented service, which means that the location-allocation problem 
can be analysed as a modified maximum covering location problem of the private sector. This means that a 
relaxation or modification of the total coverage is necessary to ensure that every club is profitable The relaxation 
in these models is that not ALL-potential consumers have to be covered but as many as possible in terms of not 
jeopardising the economic profitability or cost-effectiveness of the facilities. The basic objective of this 
relaxation is to introduce or consider a fixed number of facilities, which are to be located in service areas 
combined with maximising the demands covered. The used modified maximum covering first implies the 
presence of a status quo situation with 18 clubs. In a second stage an exogenous defined number, in this case 14 
heterogeneous clubs, is located in a potential Hotelling maxim in the most densely populated urban centre or in 
Lösch maxim in the other centre.  This approach leads to the results that, in contrast with the deductive location-




is not an “optimiser” but a “satisfier”, with personal motives, preferences, and behaviour. They locate 
subjective quality differences and characteristics and make an individual classification of the different clubs. 
This subjective approach and the introduction of time distance assumes that the “top football club” has to sell its 
product to the market. The opening up of an area and the attraction of other clubs lead to the creation of spatial 
competition and the existence of unequal service areas. The heterogeneity of the clubs is projected in their 
differences in local consumption and impact on the region, the centrality, and has an influence on the market 
and/or the service area.  These subjective markets will be used as the basis for the location-allocation model. 
 
4.3. The data 
 
The empirical model with its heterogeneity relaxation is based on the 45,791 season ticket-holders of the 
different clubs in the first division for the season 1997-98 in Belgium and the data of the promoted clubs in the 
other seasons. The data have been corrected with the additional information given by the 290.252 fancards
8. 
These data are in their own way a reflection of the subjective cultural-historical topophilia or place pride related 
to each club. The changes caused by the promotion and the relegation for the seasons 1998-99, 1999-2000, 2000-
01 and 2001-02 are placed in the model. The total number of clubs that have played in the first division in that 
period was 23.  
 
 
Figure 2 The location of the 23 teams in Belgium 
 
The season ticket-holders holders are the consumers through which the consumption of the service “top-football” 
is assured, they can be considered as the “loyal” or “hard-core”-supporters. The nominal number of season 
ticket-holders is not a reflection of the real consumption of the product. The nominal values have to be corrected 
to a relative value that indicates the real attendance. Otherwise, a club with a relatively high number of season 
ticket-holders and a relatively minor number of floating attendances should have a larger potential market than a 
club with not as many season ticket-holders but a large potential market of floating attendance. The correction is 
based on the real number of attendants who support the home teams. The Belgian Football Association (KBVB) 














j x = 100  
S
n
j = the nominal number of season ticket-holders for club j 
S
n
t    = the sum of the nominal number of season ticket-holders for all clubs in a season 
W
n
j    = the nominal number of home attendances for club j 
W
n
t   = the sum of the nominal number of home attendances for all clubs in one season 
S
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The empirical determination of the markets and service areas implied the formulation of a model through which 
the 589 Belgian communities can possibly be assigned to one or more clubs. To do so, a reference-index is 
                                                 
8 The football fan in Belgium has to buy a fancard of a club to attend the game. Persons with a past of hooliganism cannot buy such a card 




introduced to analyse the coverage of these communities. The endogenous reference-index, Ri is the average 
corrected number of season ticketholders for every 10,000 inhabitants.  
More formally, 
 












t =  
Bt   = total population of the total market, in this case Belgium
9.  
Bt   Ri  = endogenous reference-index 
 
The empirical determination of the service area and market of the clubs implies the creation of a model that 
should make it possible to assign the communities to one of the18 clubs. The model is based on the community 
consumption index, Ci, the club specific consumption index, Cij and the club specific penetration index Pij 
of “ professional football” in those communities. 
 
The community consumption index, Ci measures the rate of consumption of the service professional football in 
the communities, and is calculated as follows: 
 








Ci = local consumption index in location i 
S
c
ij = corrected number of season ticketholders of club j in location i 
Bi = total population in location i
10 
 






ij x 10,000 
 









ij  x 10.000 
 
An important parameter is the local consumption index Ljj. This is the rate of consumption of professional 
football in the centre where the club is located. A high rate means a strong relative attachment of the inhabitants 
but can also be an indicator of local saturation. This means that a growth of local consumption is not the 
potential solution for attracting more people. The only possible growth has to be a rise in centrality or with other 
words attracting attendances from outside the centre. 
 
The local consumption index, Ljj is: 
                                                 
9 The total potential consumers, the total population of Belgium, was in the year 2000 10,163,910(NIS)  
10 The number of demand nodes i taken is the 589 communities after the merger of 1977
10. The population of these communities 









jj x 10,000 
S
c
jj = corrected number of season ticketholders of club j in location j, the location of the club 
B j = total population in location j, the location of club j 
  
The measurement of the market 
 
The determination of the markets implies the creation of a classification for the allocation of the communities 
and their potential consumers. This allocation is translated in an allocation rate Aij based on a combination Cij 
and Pij in the 589 communities in Belgium. The minimal rate of 10 for Pij is used to eliminate the sporadic 
consumer from the allocation model.  
 
Pij divides the total market in: 
 
-  monopoly area: the area dominated by one club  
-  monopolistic competition area: the spatial competition is strong but one club still has more than 50% 
market share  
-  rest area: the area with a low rate of number of potential attendance for a club 
-  non-covered area 
 
The level of Cij results, as shown in the model, in a further subdivision in an a, b or c. This is an indication for 
the strength of the penetration. The subdivision b or c indicates that a “new club” has the possibility of spatial 
competition or that the existing club(s) still has the potential to gain attendance from this area if they improve the 
quality of their services. The Ab and Ac areas are non-saturated monopolistic areas and indicate the direction of 
growth potential for a club.  
 
The monopolistic competition area is the potential spatial growth zone. These areas can, depending on the 
quality of the services, be transformed in a monopoly or rest/non covered area.   
 




4.3. The results 
 
The model locates the communities in one or several areas of the clubs and it indicates the non-covered areas in 
Belgium. The potential consumers for each area and each club is the sum of Aij. The non-covered population is 
therefore the sum of the population of the non-covered areas and the relative parts of the Bi that are not assigned 
to the monopolic competition and rest areas.  
 
 
Table 1: The A-B-C zones of the 23 clubs 
 
The results for the 23 heterogeneous clubs in the first division for the 1997/98 to 2001/02 seasons are shown in 
table 2. The combination of spatial competition, cultural (language) barriers, country-province borders, time-




the clubs. This empirical outcome shows that the total coverage equals 7,364,354 or 72.5% of the Belgian 
population and 37.4% of the population belongs to the monopolistic area of a club.  
 
An important parameter is the local consumption index Ljj. A high rate means a strong relative attachment of the 
inhabitants but can also be an indicator of local saturation. The only possible growth has to be a rise in centrality, 
this means attracting attendances from outside the centre. 
 
Table 2: The local consumption indexes 
 
 
The combination of the market and Ljj make it possible to divide the heterogeneous clubs in some more 
homogeneous subgroups. 
 
Table 3: The more homogeneous subgroups 
 
 
Saey & Lietaer(1980) determined that the theoretical range of a regional service area in Flanders or the 
accessibility class was set to 15km.  According to the “traffic principle” 15km was the regional impact zone of a 
regional centre. A football club playing in the first division can be seen as a hierarchical marginal good that is, 
because of the exogenous limit of 18 clubs, an indicator of an urban hierarchical level
11. The combination of the 
number of first division clubs, the Belgian urban hierarchical centre and a professional football club as a 
hierarchical marginal good lead us to a theoretical range of a regional club of 15km. 
 
-  The national clubs are monoliths and an obstacle for the extension of other clubs in the nearby region. 
Their real range extends to a large degree the threshold of ”professional football” in Belgium. The 
service area exceeds the theoretical 15km. They dominate their region and determine endogenously their 
spatial market zone. FC Brugge is located in a regional city and can be seen as a functional substitution 
of Gent which has only a regional impact. These clubs have a low Ljj so that even today a potential 
endogenous growth of attendances is possible. 
 
-  The result for the “regional” clubs in regional and major cities shows a spatial monopolistic Lösch 
maxim for SC Charleroi and RC Genk. The situation in E.Aalst shows the existence of spatial 
competition with AA Gent and SC Anderlecht/Brussel. KV Mechelen has a spatial competition with 
Lier and the monolith Anderlecht and to a lesser degree with GBAntwerp, FC Antwerp and VC 
Westerlo. KV Oostende has strong spatial competition for its service area and market with FC Brugge. 
The club relegated after one year(1998/99) back to the second division. KV Kortrijk relegated also after 
one year(1998/99) and now plays in the third division.  AA La Louvière promoted after an absence of 21 
years to the first division in 2000 and has a minor service area. AA Gent and SC Charleroi have a low 
Ljj so when the attendances can rise substantially in periods that the clubs will be successful.    
 
-  The “small” clubs in the small cities which have, as seen in the values of their B and C zones, a limited 
centrality depend for a great part on local consumption. The lack of centrality is combined with the 
psychological barrier consisting of a refusal of descending in the urban hierarchy. To illustrate, the 
population of the regional centre Sint-Niklaas is not prepared to consume the service “professional 
football” offered by nearby small cities Beveren and Lokeren.(Dejonghe, 2001:442-448) Harelbeke is 
part of the agglomeration Kortrijk and Westerlo, is in the classification of Van Der Haegen et all.(1982) 
a “main village”.  The club has a very high relative consumption in the local community, but lacks 
centrality and a refusal to descend in the urban hierarchy. The combination of these characteristics 
results in a small number of potential consumers and indicates that the attendances are at their 
                                                 
11 The urban centres in Belgium are, according to their centrality, classified in a hierarchical urban system. There is one urban centre in 




maximum. The average attendances reach a maximum of 8,000 – 10,000 in very successful periods but 
drop to 2,000-3,000 in less successful periods.  
 
-  The local clubs in major cities have a very low Ljj and probably an enormous growth potential. 
RWDMolenbeek is located in Brussel in a theoretical Hottelling maxim with SC Anderlecht.  This 
monolith transformed Brussel into a Lösch maxim and a second club in Brussel is thereby no option. 
The Antwerp situation shows a Hotelling  maxim of two clubs which are both not using the economic 
potentials of the city . 
 
4.4. The empirical allocation-location of 14 clubs 
 
The transformation to 14 clubs 
 
The restructuring of the first division to 14 clubs implies the elimination, relocation or merging of several clubs 
and the creation of totally new clubs in selected locations. The method that was used to create “new” clubs in 
certain regional centres was to give the potential club the characteristics of the different “regional clubs in 
regional cities”. The result was a minimum and a maximum potential market taking into account the potential 
spatial competition of the existing clubs. The spatial markets and the number of potential consumers as a result 
of a theoretical merger of two or more clubs was determined by and deducted form the data of the individual 
clubs. The result is shown in table 4 and figure 3. 
 
 
Table 4: The empirical first division with 14 
 
The table shows us that despite a reduction by 4 clubs: 
 
-  the coverage increased to 77.9% of the total population  
-  an expansion of the monopolistic area to 51.0% of the total population is seen 
-  an individual consumer potential that rose to at least 288,916 combined with a high Ljj for the three 
clubs with the smallest market.  
-  The elimination of E Aalst, a club located in  a regional city on the highway E40, a corridor for the 
monoliths Anderlecht and Brugge. 
-  The potential new location in the regional city Leuven (between Brussel and Liège) has a monopolistic 
zone of 123,748 and a B and C zone of 59,686-95,498 was not selected. Other potential locations such as 
the regional city and capital of Walloon Namur (255.764) and the regional city Verviers(205,524) were 
not selected.  
-  Sint-Truiden is a well-equipped small town of level 3 with a strong polarisation in the urban hierarchy. 
Van Hecke(1997:106) determined a service area of 425km², a zone that is bigger that those of the 
regional cities Oostende(361km²), Aalst(296km²), Kortrijk(284km²), St Niklaas(258km²) and 
Mechelen(238km²). The club is located in a monopolistic Lösch maxim with a high centrality in the 




Figure 3: The empirical rationalised first division with 14 clubs. 
 





The academic study started with the data of 1997/98 and the first results were published in 2001 and created a 
storm of protest in the football world. Today, June 2003, we can confront the results of our research with the 
existing situation. RWDMolenbeek, RC Harelbeke, and SK Lommel, three clubs without any future in the 
model, claimed bankruptcy and were expulsed from the football competition. KV Kortrijk, according the model 
had to merge with Harelbeke and the second division club Waregem, and E Aalst, a club that on empirical based 
data had no future in the first division, went bankrupt and was relegated to the third division. KV Mechelen, 
which according the model had to merge with Lierse, went bankrupt and will be placed in the third division in 
2003-04. Clubs as SK Lierse, GB Antwerpen, La Louvière, SC Charleroi and the current second divisionclub V. 
Geel have because of their debts to Social Security, taxes and others, every year problems with their licence. The 
potential revenues from transferring players dried up because of the implosion of the Belgian and European 
football market. This result shows us that a theoretical model based on empirical data can be of some use to the 
real world but in the short term subjective arguments can be used to postpone the reality.  
It remains to been seen if a BENE-league would draw bigger crowds, more sponsors and better TV revenues, 
especially since the top teams in the Netherlands can negotiate their own TV rights. 
 
Modest solidarity still existing among the 18 first division clubs in Belgiuù is under pressure. On the one hand, 
the two top teams, Bruges and Anderlecht are anxious to keep up with Europe. On the other hand they need their 
own Mickey Mouse league to qualify for the European Champions League. Anderlecht is on the verge of 
becoming a G14 member. Once a permanent European competition stage created, the major Belgian clubs are 
bound to break away, leaving the others behind.
12 
 
These facts show that in an economic environment a restructuring of the Belgian professional football league is 
necessary for some reasons: 
  
-  To enter competition with other European countries  
-  The introduction of the licence system by the Belgian Football Association in 2000-01 and in the near 
future(2004-05) by the UEFA, because clubs would ,o longer be allowed to have debts to the social 
security system, inland revenue, players,…  
-  To stop the gradually increasing number of bankruptcies since the introduction of the licence system 
 




The divergence between the American profit maximisation leagues and the historically based utility 
maximisation in Europe was accelerated through the Bosman Case. The necessity of revenues from 
broadcasting, merchandising and sponsoring resulted in a strong commercialisation of professional football. 
Professional football was transformed into a consumer-oriented service that could be linked to an endogenous 
demand-oriented growth model. This transformation showed that the factor “market” became very important and 
had economic consequences on the Belgian professional football competition. The introduction of professional 
football based on economic principles resulted in a decline of Belgian football.  The Belgian competition 
reached a relative maximum in attendances and the market is too small to compete with other European 
competitions. The Belgian league has too many clubs in the first division and many of them have great financial 
problems and a very small market. The restructuring of this market of heterogeneous clubs can be seen as an 
allocation-location problem. The solution of an allocation-location problem in an existing market has to take into 
account the historical and cultural situation. The transformation of football from a utility maximising to a more 
profit maximising consumers-oriented service implies the creation of a model based on empirical data. Tabula 
rasa is not an option because of the heterogeneous characteristics of the different football clubs. This means that 
a theoretical maximum covering solution can be used as a guide for the restructuring of an existing spatial 
distribution.  
                                                 





The problem with Belgian football competition is that in the long run, and as reality shows us in the short term, 
the contemporary situation will lead to market failures and the elimination of some of the clubs. The solution 
proposed in this paper is the creation of a new professional competition with fewer teams combined with 
territorial exclusivity in a centre with a potential number of consumers that reach a certain absolute or relative 
threshold. The empirical allocation-location model combine the maximising of the total coverage and the 
individual market of the clubs and accounts for the existing situation. The result is the creation of a first division 
with 14 clubs combined with a larger coverage of the population in Belgium. The 14 allocated and located clubs 
have a greater coverage and monopolistic area than the 23 existing clubs. The transformation, based on empirical 
data, implies a merging of several clubs, sometimes combined with relocation or in the case of E. Aalst, 
RWDMolenbeek, SK Lommel and KV Oostende the elimination of the existing club in the professional league. 
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Club Ljj  Club  Ljj 
SC Anderlecht  33,37  SK Beveren  157,41 
St Liège  20,15  St Truiden VV  261,80 
FC Brugge  74,32  AA La Louvière  133,54 
SC Charleroi  32,26 KV  Kortrijk  136,60 
AA Gent  49,04  RWDMolenbeek  8,92 
RC Genk  208,70  SK Lommel  412,60 
GBAntwerpen* 17,79  KV  Oostende  103.91 
SK Lierse  176,31  V Geel  271.69 
Exc Moeskroen  214,20  SC Lokeren  203,47 
FC Antwerp  16,51  VC Westerlo  395,31 
KV Mechelen  156,20  RC Harelbeke  234,59 
E Aalst  168,80     
Table 2: The local consumption indexes 
 
* The value for GB Antwerpen was calculated on the data from G Ekeren, the first division club that merged with the third 





Group  Club  Location 










Regional clubs in regional cities with a high Ljj  RC Genk 





























































FC Antwerp – GB Antwerpen 
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Lierse – Mechelen 





Beveren – Lokeren 
Westerlo – Geel –Turnhout 











































TOTAAL     7,921,561  5,185,169 
Table 4: The empirical first division with 14 
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Total  A  Aa Ab  Ac B Ba  Bb  Bc  C Ca Cb 
SC Anderlecht  1.350.055  517.629 197.272 75.062 245.295 368.831 56.819 55.553 256.259 463.595 240.034 223.561
Standard Luik  1.080.395  872.705 34.477 102.424 735.804 27565 8.930 0 18.635 180.125 81.638 98.487
FC Brugge  768.074  386.535 207.748 127.547 51.240 198.769 79.384 44.989 74.396 182.770 97.194 85.576
SC Charleroi  462.634  365.511 0 274.052 91.459 62.718 0 30.723 31.995 34.405 26.616 7.789
AA Gent  406.902  252.919 252.919 0 0 104298 21.896 70.164 12.238 49685 30.812 18.873
RC Genk  403.848  212.194 212.194 0 0 96.512 37.679 14.645 44.185 95.142 79.649 15.093
GBAntwerpen  319.678  112.351 42.338 0 70.013 00  00 207327 203.864 3.463
SK Lierse  262.822  119.928 111.643 0 8.285 85.972 33.619 16.846 35.307 56.922 35.490 21.432
Ex Moeskroen  248.835  231.810 131.791 94.448 5.571 5.057 0 0 5.057 11.968 6.262 5.706
FC Antwerp  234.380  0 0 0 0 4.972 0 0 4.972 229.408 216.443 12.965
KV Mechelen  199.094  119.424 119.424 0 0 39.610 18.522 9.902 11.186 40.060 25.066 14.994
E Aalst  185.843  76.197 76.197 0 0 51.350 33.555 17.795 0 58.296 33.419 24.877
SK Beveren  179.252  75.877 44.533 31.344 0 89.594 0 9.363 80.231 13.781 7.951 5.830
St Truiden VV  178.971  90.497 90.497 0 0 30.717 18.929 7.547 4.241 57.757 39.495 18.262
La Louvière  173.955  76.809 76.809 0 0 86 .412 52.919  11.474 22.019 10.734 0 10.734
KV Kortrijk  170.442  75.639 75.639 0 0 52.138 44.171 0 7.967 42.665 21.062 21.603
RWDMolenbeek 163.411  0 0 0 0 74.919 57.410 0 17.509 88.492 38.052 50.440
SK Lommel  126.071  38.067 29.644 0 8.423 53.961 29.643 14.282 10.036 34.043 30.379 3.664
KV Oostende  106.458  58.245 58.245 0 0 13.742 13.742 0 0 34.471 14.302 20.169
V Geel  98.138  17.379 17.379 0 0 54.730 54.730 0 0 26.029 21.442 4.587
SC Lokeren  93.904  36.123 36.123 0 0 9.954 0 0 9.954 47.827 23.600 24.227
VC Westerlo  82.722  34.884 34.884 0 0 9.057 9.057 0 0 38.781 28.345 10.436
RC Harelbeke  68.470  26.418 26.418 0 0 23.105 0 23.105 0 18.947 17.939 1.008
7.364.354 3.797.141   
 
Table 1: De 23 A-B-C zones 